Body of Knowledge
... consider the formally contrary phenomenological argument, that if there is no consciousness without object of consciousness, then there is no object without consciousness-of-object
Consciousness and Object Dependency
The phenomenological argument posits that consciousness is inherently intentional, meaning it is always consciousness of something, and thus cannot exist without an object This view is central to the work of Franz Brentano, who argued that every mental phenomenon is directed toward an object, and that consciousness is defined by this intentionality From this perspective, the object of consciousness is not a separate, independent entity but is constituted by the act of consciousness itself.
This leads to a formal contradiction when considering the reverse: if consciousness requires an object, then the object itself cannot exist independently of consciousness. The argument suggests that the object is not a pre-existing, mind-independent entity but is instead brought into being through the act of being perceived or experienced. This is supported by the phenomenological claim that self-awareness is not an objectified, reflective act but a pre-reflective, non-objectifying awareness In this view, one is aware of one's experience not as an object, but as lived through, meaning the object is not separate from the consciousness that apprehends it
This perspective is echoed in the work of Donald D. Hoffman and Chetan Prakash, who argue that the perception of objects and space-time emerges from the dynamics of interacting conscious agents, rather than being representations of pre-existing physical truths They suggest that physical properties like position and momentum are not inherent in objects when unperceived, but are instead properties of conscious agents This challenges the assumption of object permanence, which underlies much of physicalist and computational models of perception
Furthermore, the idea that consciousness is the ground reality, with the external world being inferred rather than directly observed, aligns with the phenomenological stance According to this view, everything we experience—our thoughts, perceptions, and the external world—is an object of consciousness, and consciousness itself cannot be an object of its own experience This creates a foundational asymmetry: the subject of consciousness cannot be an object of its own subjective awareness, as the observer cannot observe itself directly
Thus, the formally contrary argument—that there is no object without consciousness-of-object—follows from the phenomenological understanding of consciousness as inherently intentional and non-objectifying. The object is not independent of consciousness; rather, it is constituted by the act of consciousness, and its existence is dependent on being experienced This view stands in contrast to physicalist models that assume objects exist independently of perception
... a nicely articulated statement which offers numerous directions for elaboration, but before leaving the subject consider the classic transcendental meditation of putting all objects of consciousness out of mind except for consciousness thus consciousness itself becomes the object of consciousness
Consciousness as Its Own Object in Meditation
In classical transcendental meditation, the practice of setting aside all objects of consciousness aims to isolate pure awareness. This state, known as Transcendental Consciousness or turiya, is described as a self-referral experience where the subject of awareness becomes identical with awareness itself—transcending the usual subject-object split.
While consciousness cannot be an object in the conventional sense—since it is the medium through which objects appear—meditative traditions suggest that through sustained attention and de-identification, one can experience consciousness as such. This is not an introspective observation of mental content, but a direct, non-dual awareness of presence itself.
In deep meditative absorption (samadhi), the distinction between observer and observed dissolves. As the Upanishads describe, this is a state "neither inward nor outward," where consciousness is aware only of itself—not as an object, but as the self-luminous ground of experience.
... good definition, which, however leaves one more possibility that of deliberate non-consciousness shutting the eyes so to speak to all objects of consciousness
Deliberate non-consciousness—such as "shutting the eyes" to all objects of consciousness—is not an absence of awareness but a meditative act of withdrawing attention from all content while maintaining wakeful presence. This state, described in yogic and Buddhist traditions as nirodha or samadhi, involves the suspension of mental activity (citta-vritti) without loss of consciousness.
Rather than unconsciousness, it is a refined state of pure subjectivity (mahattattva), where even the sense of individual doership (ahamtattva) dissolves. In Savikalpa Samadhi, for instance, all objects and egoic identity fade, leaving only a non-dual awareness—a "blissful infinite consciousness" that is not unconscious but hyper-aware of being itself.
Thus, this deliberate "shutting out" is not unconsciousness but a radical simplification of consciousness, where awareness turns back upon itself, not as an object, but as bare presence.
... what an exciting idea! -that the object of consciousness is within consciousness pre-positionally speaking, not outside, or without consciousness
Indeed, the idea that the object of consciousness is within consciousness—not merely observed but constituted by it—is central to both phenomenology and contemplative philosophy. As Franklin Merrell-Wolff observed, "Within the bosom of Consciousness-without-an-object lies the power of awareness that projects objects." This suggests that objects do not exist outside consciousness, but arise within it as expressions of its inherent potential.
Prepositionally, the object is not in consciousness like a thing in a container, but within as an appearance to awareness—projected, sustained, and withdrawn by it. There is no "outside" independent of this field; as Wolff asserts, "Outside of Consciousness-without-an-object nothing is."
Thus, the object is not incidentally in consciousness—it is fundamentally within it, as its self-expression.
... excellent resolution which suggests the answer to the problem of dualism, the supposed mind-body problem, that mind and object or body are not separate but one a unity that consciousness is a unity phenomenologically
Indeed, the resolution of dualism lies in recognizing consciousness as a unified field in which mind and body are not separate substances but intimately interwoven aspects of a single lived reality. Phenomenologists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Edmund Husserl argue that consciousness is fundamentally embodied—the body (Leib) is not an object observed by the mind but the very medium through which consciousness engages the world.
As Merleau-Ponty shows, when you write, your fingers typing are not controlled by a detached mind; the act is a unified expression of embodied intentionality. Similarly, Husserl describes the human being as a psychosomatic unity, where psyche and body mutually penetrate, not externally linked but constitutively intertwined.
Thus, the mind-body problem dissolves when we see that consciousness is not in the body, nor is the body in consciousness—rather, they arise together within the primordial unity of experience.