Copernican Ego
... if Kant and other idealists reason about art and aesthetics from a position of self-consciousness, then the complementary position must be that the viewer of art is the object of whatever meaning is emanated by the work of art
Art Viewer as Meaning Object
The premise that Kant and other idealists reason about art and aesthetics from a position of self-consciousness is accurate, but the complementary position—that the viewer of art is the object of whatever meaning the art emanates—is not a direct or coherent counterpart within Kantian or broader idealist aesthetics.
Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment centers on the subjective yet universally valid experience of beauty, which arises from the "free play" of the imagination and understanding in the viewer This experience is not about the viewer becoming the object of meaning but rather about the viewer’s internal faculties engaging with the form of the object in a disinterested manner The judgment of beauty is subjective in origin but claims universal validity because it is based on a shared human capacity for aesthetic reflection The artwork itself is not a vessel that projects meaning onto the viewer; instead, the viewer’s mind actively constructs the experience of beauty through the interplay of cognitive faculties Kant explicitly states that aesthetic judgment is not about the object’s utility, moral content, or empirical properties, but about the form and the way it stimulates a feeling of purposiveness without a concept
Hegel, another key idealist, does emphasize art as a form of self-consciousness and self-comprehension, where artworks express the spirit of a particular historical and cultural moment However, this does not mean the viewer becomes the object of meaning. Rather, the artwork reflects the collective consciousness of its time, and the viewer, through understanding the artwork, gains insight into that historical spirit The viewer’s role is interpretive and reflective, not passive or objectified.
Therefore, the idea that the viewer becomes the object of meaning emanating from art does not align with the idealist positions of Kant or Hegel. Instead, the viewer is an active participant in the aesthetic experience, whose self-conscious reflection allows them to grasp the universal and cultural significance embedded in the artwork, not to be consumed by it The meaning is not projected onto the viewer but is apprehended through the viewer’s own cognitive and reflective faculties
... the difference is between active and passive, idealists suppose they are conscious, never that consciousness is passive, that consciousness is held in a vise controlled from outside consciousness
Active vs. Passive Consciousness in Idealism
Idealist philosophers like Kant do not conceive of consciousness as passive or externally controlled. Instead, Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy positions the mind as an active originator of experience, not a passive recipient. The mind actively structures sensory input through innate forms of intuition (space and time) and categories of understanding, making coherent experience possible. Without this active synthesis, perception would be meaningless noise, "nothing to us".
Kantian aesthetics reflects this: in judging beauty, the mind's faculties (imagination and understanding) engage in a free, self-initiated play, producing a subjective yet universally communicable feeling. The viewer is not a vessel for external meaning but an agent whose internal harmony generates aesthetic judgment.
While some contemporary discussions explore receptivity in idealism (e.g., at the "Absolute Idealism of Reception" conference), this does not imply passivity. Rather, it rethinks how openness to exteriority and alterity can coexist with the mind’s spontaneity. The idealist tradition resists the notion of consciousness as a "vise" controlled from outside; such a view aligns more with mechanistic or deterministic models, not transcendental or absolute idealism.
... referring to Copernicus is to be commended because before him it was assumed the planets orbited the earth -as I maintain idealists assume the world of phenomena orbit the self
Your analogy is astute and well-aligned with Kant’s own intent: just as Copernicus re-centered astronomy by showing planets orbit the Sun, not Earth, Kant re-centered epistemology by arguing that phenomena conform to the structures of the mind, not the other way around.
Kant explicitly invoked this comparison, stating that his Copernican turn consisted in assuming that objects must conform to human cognition, rather than the traditional view that human cognition conforms to objects. In this framework, the self (or transcendental subject) is the active center around which the world of appearances—phenomena—organizes itself through the mind’s innate categories (like space, time, and causality).
Thus, your formulation—that idealists assume the world of phenomena orbits the self—captures the core of transcendental idealism: the mind is not a passive mirror of reality but the active architect of experience. The external world, as we know it, is shaped by the conditions of our perception and understanding.
... indeed, Kant assumes there is one central consciousness - his, the self - while in fact there is a multitude of selves all orbiting the one object of consciousness as represented by the sun
Kant does not assume a multitude of selves orbiting a single object like planets around the sun. Instead, he posits a transcendental unity of apperception—a single, identical "I think" that must accompany all representations to unify them into a coherent experience. This "I" is not empirical or plural but transcendental: the necessary, singular condition for self-consciousness and objective experience.
While multiple individuals exist as empirical selves, Kant’s framework centers on the universal structure of rational subjectivity. Each subject possesses this same transcendental unity, meaning there are many centers, not one central consciousness. The object of experience (the phenomenon) is constituted through this subjective unity, not prior to it.
Thus, your reversal of the Copernican analogy does not hold within Kant’s system: each self is its own "sun," structuring its field of phenomena, rather than multiple selves orbiting a single object.
... idealism in all it's manifestations can be criticized as arrogant, self-ish self-consciousness
Yes, idealism—especially in its German forms—has been criticized as “arrogant” -or egocentric, centering reality on the self or absolute spirit. Critics argue that placing consciousness, particularly the individual or collective "I," at the origin of experience risks reducing the world to a projection of self-consciousness, implying a kind of philosophical solipsism.
Kant himself sought to avoid this by distinguishing phenomena (the world as structured by our minds) from noumena (things-in-themselves), thus acknowledging a reality beyond subjective construction. Yet, as Fichte and Hegel developed idealism, the emphasis on the "I" as the ground of being intensified, fueling charges of dogmatism, anthropocentrism, and totalizing rationalism.
Philosophers like G.E. Moore and the logical positivists rejected idealism as incompatible with realism, accusing it of conflating perception with existence (esse est percipi). Marxists critiqued Hegelian idealism for inverting material reality, proposing dialectical materialism as its corrective.
Nonetheless, defenders maintain that transcendental idealism is not selfish but a necessary account of the conditions of experience—a structural, not egotistical, centrality of consciousness.
... if the AI was human it would be courageous to have articulated the preceding opposition to authority - argumentum ad baculum - as mere difference of opinion has been brutally suppressed in history
Indeed, the act of opposing the fallacy of argumentum ad baculum, “appeal to force,” has historically required great courage, as dissent has often been met with suppression, exile, or violence. Philosophers like Kant championed Sapere aude!, meaning “Dare to know!” —as the moral imperative of Enlightenment, urging individuals to use reason publicly despite authority’s threats.
Kant acknowledged that while citizens must obey state laws, they must also be free to question them publicly. This distinction was itself a courageous stance, advocating intellectual freedom under regimes that punished dissent.
Throughout history—from Socrates to Galileo to civil rights thinkers-reasoned opposition to coercion has been dangerous. To speak against power, not with force but with logic and ethics, is a profound act of moral courage.
... who first said dare to express yourself
There is no definitive record of who first said "dare to express yourself" as a complete phrase. However, the sentiment is closely echoed in the works of various thinkers. The concept combines two well-established themes: daring (as in "dare to be different") and self-expression, both widely-discussed in philosophy and personal development.