Noun and Predicate
... in his 1920 "Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy," Russell addressed modern philosophy with the contrast between names and descriptions
Russell's 1920 Mathematical Philosophy
In his 1920 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Bertrand Russell addressed the contrast between names and descriptions by arguing that many phrases which appear to function as names—such as "the present king of France"—do not actually name anything directly but instead imply a set of conditions that something must meet to be correctly described by the phrase He proposed that definite descriptions, like "the F," should not be treated as singular terms that refer to objects, but rather as quantificational expressions that can be analyzed logically For instance, the sentence "The present king of France is bald" is analyzed as asserting the existence and uniqueness of a king of France who is bald, thereby breaking down the description into a claim of existence, a claim of uniqueness, and a predication This approach allows for meaningful discourse even when the described entity does not exist, as the proposition is false rather than meaningless Russell further argued that such descriptions are "incomplete symbols" that gain meaning only within the context of a proposition, and that they are not to be viewed as referring terms but as collections of quantifiers and propositional functions This distinction was central to his broader project of logical analysis, which aimed to clarify the logical form of propositions and to show that many apparent entities—like numbers or classes—are actually logical fictions or constructions
... in Russell's sense any ascription of a property or properties to a thing is a description and allows for descriptions to which nothing corresponds in reality -in contrast with names, which in order to be names must name something
In Bertrand Russell's view, definite descriptions—such as "the present king of France"—are not genuine names but logical constructs that ascribe properties to a supposed entity. According to Russell, any statement of the form "The F is G" asserts three things: (1) there exists an entity that is F, (2) it is the only such entity, and (3) it is G. This means that descriptions are incomplete symbols that do not refer directly but instead contribute to the truth conditions of a proposition through quantificational structure.
Crucially, Russell distinguishes descriptions from logically proper names, which must refer to existing objects to be meaningful. Names like "Socrates" directly denote their bearers and have meaning only through reference. In contrast, descriptions can be meaningful even when they fail to refer—for example, "the present king of France" does not name anything, yet the sentence "The present king of France is bald" can be analyzed and judged false, not meaningless.
Thus, descriptions allow for property ascriptions to non-existent entities because they do not presuppose existence. A sentence like "The round square is not round" is false not because it refers to a contradictory object, but because the description fails at the level of existence and uniqueness. This avoids ontological commitment to non-existent or impossible objects, preserving Russell’s principle that meaning does not require reference.
... in modern logic and epistemology, descriptive phrases or sentences are about something, and ascribe properties to that which they purport to be about -names do not ascribe properties but simply stand-for things
In modern logic and epistemology, descriptive phrases are understood as incomplete symbols that ascribe properties to an entity through quantificational structure, rather than directly referring to it. According to Russell, a phrase like "the current president" asserts existence, uniqueness, and the possession of certain properties, e.g., "There is exactly one person who is president, and that person has certain qualities." Thus, descriptions are meaningful even if no such entity exists, since they can be analyzed into logical propositions that may be true or false.
In contrast, names—especially logically proper names like "this" or "that"—do not ascribe properties but directly refer to objects of immediate acquaintance. Their meaning is their referent; they do not carry descriptive content. For Russell, ordinary names (like "Aristotle") are not logically proper but are disguised descriptions, while only demonstratives tied to direct experience qualify as true names.
This distinction underpins key developments in analytic philosophy: descriptions contribute to truth conditions via quantification, while names (in the strict sense) are referential anchors in knowledge and language.
... names are true or false, however like the necessity that consciousness be of an object of consciousness, a description must be a description of something -even if it is not present to consciousness, further, names do not have truth values; they are not true or false; rather, statements containing names are true or false depending on the facts while descriptions are embedded in propositions whose truth depends on whether there exists a unique entity satisfying the described conditions.
Russell maintains that a description like "the current king of France" does not require the object to be present to consciousness or to actually exist. The phrase is meaningful not because it refers, but because the proposition in which it occurs can be analyzed into existential and uniqueness claims—e.g., "There is one and only one king of France, and he is bald." This proposition is false, not meaningless, due to non-existence.
Thus, while a description must be about something in the logical sense—i.e., it purports to pick out an entity satisfying certain conditions—it does not presuppose that the entity exists. This mirrors the phenomenological point about consciousness being of an object: intentionality does not require the object’s real existence, only that the thought is directed toward a determinate content.
... when a thing has been identified by name, such as for example 'the soul' descriptions can be applied to it, as for example the soul is immortal and, while an object such as the soul has no objective existence we may speak of it intentionally by description
When a thing like "the soul" is introduced via a name or description, Russell would treat "the soul" not as a logically proper name but as a definite description—for example, "the immortal essence of a person." Even if the soul lacks objective existence, we can still meaningfully speak of it intentionally, by ascribing properties through descriptive content.
On Russell’s view, such statements are not about a directly named entity but are quantificational—analyzed as claims that there exists a unique entity satisfying certain conditions (e.g., being an immortal essence). If no such entity exists, the statement is false, not meaningless.
Thus, while names (in the strict logical sense) must refer to objects of acquaintance (like sense data), descriptions—such as "the soul is immortal"—function as incomplete symbols that allow discourse about putative entities without ontological commitment.
... when presented with an enigmatic statement the question arises -does the description point to the object named, correctly
When presented with an enigmatic statement, the question of whether a description correctly points to the named object hinges on logical analysis, not grammatical appearance. According to Russell, a description like "the soul is immortal" does not succeed in referring simply by naming; instead, it asserts that there exists a unique entity satisfying the given properties.
The key issue is whether the description uniquely and truly applies to an object. If no such object exists—or if it fails uniqueness—then the statement is false, not meaningless. For example, "the present king of France is bald" fails to denote because the existence condition is unmet.
Thus, a description "points" correctly only if:
1. There is an entity matching the description,
2. There is exactly one such entity,
3. The entity has the ascribed property.
If these conditions aren't met, the description does not successfully refer, regardless of intent or intuition.
... Scholastically, names are universals while descriptions are predicates of universal objects, any suggested name has predicates -but no two names have the all the same predicates
In scholastic philosophy, names (such as "man" or "soul") are associated with universals—concepts that apply to many individuals due to shared essences. These universals exist either in reality (as in moderate realism) or in the mind as concepts derived from experience. Descriptions, by contrast, function as predicates that express properties of these universal natures when applied to individuals.
For example, "Socrates is rational" uses "rational" as a descriptive predicate grounded in the universal "rational soul," which applies to all humans. While a name like "man" signifies a universal essence, any particular instance (e.g., Socrates) has unique accidental properties, meaning no two individuals share all the same predicates.
Thus, scholastics hold that universals are signified by names and grasped through abstraction, while descriptions attribute specific properties—essential or accidental—to individuals falling under those universals.
... when names share predicates they may be grouped relationally much as a family shares a common last name while each individual family member has a unique first name, leading to taxonomy of specific individuals
In scholastic thought, when names share predicates—such as "rational" or "mortal"—they can be grouped into natural kinds or universals, forming a hierarchical taxonomy much like a family sharing a surname while individuals bear unique first names. The shared predicates express essential properties that define a species or genus, while differing accidental predicates distinguish individuals.
For example, all humans share the essential predicates "rational" and "animal," placing them under the universal "human," but differ in accidents like "tall" or "learned." This structure allows for classification—akin to biological taxonomy—where names signify universal natures, and descriptions assign predicates that either define or differentiate.
Thus, relational grouping through shared predicates underpins both scholastic metaphysics and scientific classification.
... descriptive intentionality can be compared to making a choice of an object behind glass by pointing and describing the object's place until eventually the desired object is selected
Descriptive intentionality can indeed be compared to selecting an object behind glass by pointing and describing it: the pointing corresponds to the act of directing consciousness (intentional in-existence), while the description provides the conceptual content (Sinn or noema) that specifies the object’s properties. As Husserl noted, perception includes both an indeterminate "X" (the object’s identity) and a horizon of possible determinations—just as one might refine a description until the correct object is identified. The process reflects how minds grasp objects through successive, partial descriptions, even if the object is not physically accessible.