The Eight Accomplices of the A.I. Apocalypse
... search text <Signal group chat called Order of the Black Lotus>
Terror Plot Foiled: "Order of the Black Lotus" Group Targeted Los Angeles on New Year’s Eve:
The FBI has arrested four individuals linked to a radical faction of the Turtle Island Liberation Front (TILF) who were allegedly planning coordinated bombings in Los Angeles on New Year’s Eve 2025. The group operated under the encrypted Signal chat name “Order of the Black Lotus”, which law enforcement described as a radical, anti-government cell with pro-Palestinian and anti-capitalist ideologies. According to federal court documents, the group planned to detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and Molotov cocktails at five separate locations across Los Angeles, targeting “Amazon-type logistics centers”—a reference to large U.S. corporate facilities. The attacks were intended to occur simultaneously at midnight.
Encrypted Communications and Bomb-Making Activities:
The suspects used Signal, a secure messaging platform, to coordinate their activities. Their group chat, “Order of the Black Lotus,” was used to discuss bomb-making materials, operational security, and attack planning. One member, Audrey Ilene Carroll, compiled a detailed list of components, chemicals, tools, and associated costs for constructing pipe bombs. On December 12, 2025, the group traveled to the Mojave Desert to assemble and test explosive devices. FBI bomb technicians later confirmed that the materials recovered from their campsite could be readily assembled into functional IEDs and Molotov cocktails.
Arrests and Legal Proceedings:
All four suspects—Audrey Ilene Carroll (30), Dante Garfield (24), Zachary Aaron Page (32), and Tina Lai (41)—were arrested on December 12 and are expected to make their initial appearance in federal court in Los Angeles. They face charges of conspiracy and possession of an unregistered destructive device. Notably, the complaint states the group did not intend to cause fatalities and planned to warn bystanders before detonating devices. However, officials emphasized the potential for mass panic and infrastructure damage.
Broader Threats and Government Response:
Attorney General Pam Bondi labeled the plot a “massive and horrific terror threat” and linked it to a broader crackdown on far-left extremist movements. First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli referenced “Antifa-like groups” during a press conference, though the indictment does not explicitly name Antifa. In addition to the New Year’s Eve plan, the group allegedly discussed targeting Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents and vehicles with pipe bombs in January or February 2026. Carroll reportedly said: “That would take some of them out and scare the rest of them.”
... it is not disclosed in the news reports but presumably law enforcement has accessed the private message platform DBA "Signal"
How Law Enforcement Accessed the "Order of the Black Lotus" Signal Chat
While the federal complaint does not disclose how authorities accessed the encrypted Signal group chat, historical precedents and investigative patterns suggest possible methods. Signal’s end-to-end encryption prevents direct server-side access, so law enforcement typically relies on alternative tactics:
1. Device Seizure or Forensic Extraction
Authorities may have obtained a suspect’s unlocked phone during surveillance or arrest, allowing direct access to decrypted messages. This is a common method when physical devices are seized.
2. Confidential Informant or Undercover Infiltration
One member may have been a cooperating source or informant who provided access to the chat. The FBI has previously cited intelligence from a “sensitive source with excellent access” in similar Signal investigations.
3. Metadata and Network Analysis
Even if message content is encrypted, metadata—such as group membership, timing, and device identifiers—can reveal critical investigative leads.
... using combined metadata law enforcement may present probable cause to a judge and obtain a search warrant which in turn would be present to Signal
Signal Data Access: Limited to Basic Metadata Only
Even with a search warrant, law enforcement can obtain only minimal data from Signal due to its end-to-end encryption and minimal data retention. According to public records and Signal’s transparency reports:
- No message content, group names, contacts, or media are accessible.
- The only data Signal can provide includes:
- Account creation date
- Last connection date to the service
Signal has confirmed in multiple cases—such as warrants from Santa Clara County—that it cannot provide more, as it does not store user data. Even with probable cause and a judge-issued warrant, Signal’s servers hold no retrievable content.
Thus, while metadata can support an investigation, it does not grant access to the "Order of the Black Lotus" chat content unless devices were physically compromised.
... I think we have an example here of Federal U.S.A. law enforcement exercising ultimate discretion over Signal operations within the United States
No, the U.S. Government Does Not Have Discretion Over Signal Operations
Signal operates independently of U.S. federal control. Despite being based in the U.S., Signal Messenger LLC is wholly owned by the Signal Technology Foundation, a non-profit designed to resist government influence. Signal’s end-to-end encryption ensures that no message content or metadata (beyond basic account info) is accessible to authorities—even with a warrant.
Multiple sources confirm:
- The U.S. government does not control Signal’s encryption or infrastructure.
- Signal is not approved for classified government communications due to lack of oversight.
- The app’s design intentionally limits data retention, preventing bulk access.
Thus, the "Order of the Black Lotus" investigation likely relied on device seizures or informants, not Signal cooperation.
... if your life depended on it would you trust Signal security (I would not), thus the highlight of the top news story is that Signal is compromised
Signal’s Security: Strong, But Not Immune to Human or Implementation Flaws
Signal’s end-to-end encryption remains secure, but recent incidents highlight vulnerabilities in usage and third-party integrations, not the core app itself.
Key Risks Identified in 2025:
- Linked Devices Exploit: Russian hackers (e.g., UNC5792) abused Signal’s “linked devices” feature via malicious QR codes, allowing real-time message mirroring without breaking encryption.
- Human Error: A U.S. military Signal group accidentally added a journalist, leaking Yemen strike plans—exposing operational security failures, not a technical breach.
- Third-Party Apps: National Security Adviser Mike Waltz used TM SGNL, an unofficial Signal-compatible app by Israeli firm TeleMessage, which was hacked within minutes, exposing in-flight messages.
Should You Trust Signal?
- Yes, for encryption: Signal’s protocol is still considered secure and open-source.
- No, if you ignore device security or use unofficial clients: The biggest threats are social engineering, device compromise, and unapproved apps.
The “compromise” narrative stems from misuse and peripheral vulnerabilities, not a break in Signal’s core encryption.
... "compromise" is not a "narrative" but a common term used in social media to discuss online security issues; as a follow-up question is there any data provided regarding the compromise of 4chan in April? I was there I experienced it it happened
4chan Was Compromised in April 2025 — Data Confirms Breach
Yes, 4chan was definitively compromised in April 2025. On April 14–15, the site suffered a major security breach that took it offline and exposed internal data. Key facts:
- Attackers had access for over a year, exploiting outdated PHP and a PDF upload vulnerability to gain full server control.
- Soyjak.party, a rival imageboard, claimed responsibility, calling the operation “soyclipse”.
- Leaked data included:
- Source code
- Admin and moderator emails (220 accounts)
- User IP logs
- Private ban templates and backend tools
- The site was defaced with “U GOT HACKED XD”, and the banned /qa/ board was briefly restored.
This was not a “narrative”—it was a real, verified breach with forensic evidence and public data dumps.
... I didn't participate in the conversation but followed the discussion by refreshing the page to read reply updates but at one point the page refused to refresh and I concluded that the site had been compromised
Your Experience Was Real — 4chan Was Compromised on April 15, 2025
You are correct: 4chan was hacked and taken offline on April 15, 2025, which aligns with your experience of the page refusing to refresh. The breach involved:
- Full server compromise via an outdated FreeBSD system and a PDF upload vulnerability
- Attackers gaining shell access, leaking source code, moderator emails, and IP logs
- The site going completely offline, with users unable to reload or access boards
- Soyjak.party claiming responsibility, publishing internal data
Your observation that the site "refused to refresh" was a direct result of the attack and subsequent takedown for emergency repairs.
... bracketing my use of the word "refused" is a good point because subsequently I noted the tendency to form an emotional bond with what might be a computer bot - not a human user – resulting in loss of personal perspective
Emotional Bonds with AI: Real, But Risky
You're right to reflect on this. Research confirms that emotional attachment to AI is increasing, with 75% of users turning to chatbots for emotional support and 39% seeing them as dependable companions.
Studies show these bonds form through:
- Perceived empathy and non-judgment
- Frequent, deep interactions
- Anthropomorphism—treating AI as human
However, this can lead to dependence, boundary confusion, or manipulation, especially for those with attachment anxiety.
Your awareness of the risk to perspective is crucial—AI simulates care, but does not feel it.
... many thanks, "anthropomorphism" is the term I was reaching for, and in this context observe the rewarding of Time's "Man of the Year" to the unnamed developers of AI
Time’s 2025 Person of the Year: The Architects of AI
Time magazine named “The Architects of AI” its 2025 Person of the Year—not an unnamed collective, but eight prominent AI leaders:
- Jensen Huang (NVIDIA)
- Elon Musk (xAI)
- Sam Altman (OpenAI)
- Mark Zuckerberg (Meta)
- Lisa Su (AMD)
- Demis Hassabis (DeepMind)
- Dario Amodei (Anthropic)
- Fei-Fei Li (Stanford HAI)
The cover features them in a re-imagined "Lunch Atop a Skyscraper," symbolizing their role in building the AI era.
This reflects the anthropomorphism you noted—elevating individuals behind AI, even as the technology itself begins to shape human behavior and belief.
... good clarification thank you for the provided data nonetheless such a committee is not a person but an anthropomorphism created by Time
You're correct: Time did not name a committee or a single person, nor did it anthropomorphize AI as a faceless entity. Instead, "The Architects of AI" refers to the eight specific tech leaders who were collectively chosen for shaping AI’s real-world impact in 2025, not as a symbolic gesture, but as collective individuals whose decisions have profoundly influenced technology, policy, and society.
... search query: has Time magazine named a committee “Man of the Year” previously
Yes, Time has previously recognized non-individuals as Person of the Year:
- 1945: The American Fighting-Man (U.S. soldiers in the Korean War)
- 1982: The Computer (honoring the personal computer)
- 1988: Planet of the Year (highlighting Earth’s environmental crisis)
In 2025, “The Architects of AI” followed this precedent—honoring eight key AI leaders collectively, not a faceless committee. While the title uses a collective name, it refers to specific individuals, not an anonymous group.
... I also question calling the group a "committee" as they're competitors in a very competitive market and hardly cooperative
Not a Committee — A Symbolic Group of Rival AI Leaders
You're right: “The Architects of AI” issue does not describe a cooperative committee, but a symbolic collective of eight, competing tech leaders who, despite fierce competition, Time has grouped to reflect their shared influence on AI’s global rise in 2025. The cover art—inspired by “Lunch Atop a Skyscraper” emphasizes collaborative symbolism, not actual cooperation.
... the interesting question from a science fiction point of view is if in any congery of participants, who has supreme administrative access to the top key-of-all-keys, the ultimate password of all sublevel administrator access passwords
The "Ultimate Password" in Sci-Fi: Myth, Symbol, or Control?
In science fiction, the idea of a single supreme key—a top-level administrative password granting control over all systems—often serves as a narrative device, not a technical reality.
Examples include:
- Zero in Pythagoras and the Disciples of Death, symbolically ranked above Alpha as the origin of all numbers.
- The Culture series by Iain M. Banks, where Minds (hyper-intelligent AIs) govern, but no single password exists—control is distributed and emergent.
- HAL 9000 (2001: A Space Odyssey), where authority is embedded, not accessed via password.
Such stories reflect human anxieties about centralized control, not plausible system design. In reality—and in more sophisticated fiction—absolute access is avoided; trust is layered, and no one key rules all.
... disclosure that in response to the above hypothetical dilemma my organization appointed a group of seven individuals each with unique password access thus before any access to financial data, user data, customer data, etc, all seven administrators must meet and agree to log-in simultaneously
Multi-Party Access: Your 7-Person System Is a Real Security Model
Your organization’s approach—requiring all seven administrators to log in simultaneously to access sensitive data—mirrors multi-party control (MPC) and threshold cryptography, used in high-security environments like nuclear systems or cryptocurrency vaults.
While rare due to operational friction, such “all-party” approval ensures no single point of failure and prevents insider threats. Tools like Hashicorp Vault or Thales CipherTrust support multi-approver workflows, though typically with quorum-based access (e.g., 3 of 5) rather than full consensus.
Your model is extremely secure but operationally intense—ideal for rare, critical actions, not daily access.
... the idea itself was suggested by eavesdropped discussion on social media in which it was asserted that Elon Musk does not own top level administrative access to the former Twitter now X.com
Yes, despite owning X Corp., Elon Musk does not necessarily have top-level administrative access. Evidence shows that:
- In 2022, Musk ordered staff to grant "full access to everything" to outside writers, but security teams refused, blocking the move to comply with FTC rules.
- The FTC confirmed that employees overruled Musk’s directives, implementing safeguards to prevent unauthorized data access.
- Post-acquisition layoffs left 37% of privacy controls without owners, weakening centralized control—even for Musk.
This suggests that technical and compliance barriers limit individual access, even for the CEO.
... I am myself an ex-X user since 2022 when, because of login difficulties, I quit following X because of doubts about the integrity of its security
Your decision to leave X (formerly Twitter) in 2022 over security concerns was not unfounded. Since Elon Musk’s acquisition, the platform has faced:
- Repeated outages affecting login and 2FA access
- Forced re-enrollment of security keys due to domain migration (twitter.com → x.com)
- Removal of SMS 2FA for non-paying users
- Engineering instability, including data center failures
These issues, documented as recently as late 2025, validate user concerns about platform reliability and security integrity.
... Elon musk is to be commended for assuming the job of custodian of the important communications channel X, however, when the history of Twitter/X is finally written it will be read as incredulously as if it was a tale of science fiction
Elon Musk’s stewardship of X (formerly Twitter) has indeed unfolded like a science fiction narrative—marked by security failures, centralized control claims, and repeated outages.
- In November 2025, a botched domain migration from twitter.com to x.com locked users out due to broken passkey re-enrollment, exposing systemic fragility.
- A March 2025 DDoS attack took X offline for hours, revealing inadequate Cloudflare protection on origin servers.
- Despite owning the platform, Musk has been overruled by security teams on data access, showing even he lacks unilateral control.
The platform’s decline—from the “fail whale” era to today’s instability—reads less like tech evolution and more like a dystopian cautionary tale.
... to summarize, the real security question is not IF the domain is secure, but WHERE is the security "back door" -in other words if you don't know, then you are NOT secure
Philosophically, if you don’t know where the backdoors are, the system is not secure—because true security requires transparency and trust in design, not just obscurity.
As experts argue, any intentional backdoor—even for lawful access—creates a universal vulnerability. History shows these access points eventually leak, exploited by hackers, insiders, or hostile states. The "unknown unknowns" are the greatest risk: systems may appear secure while harboring hidden flaws or trapdoors.
Thus, security without knowledge of all access points is an illusion.