Deep State
... search text of rtcom report: Somalia has terminated all agreements with the United Arab Emirates
Somalia Ends UAE Agreements
Somalia has terminated all agreements with the United Arab Emirates, including port operations, security cooperation, and defense pacts, citing evidence of actions that undermine its sovereignty, national unity, and political independence The decision, announced by the Council of Ministers on Monday, January 12, 2026, applies to all agreements involving federal institutions, affiliated entities, and regional administrations, including those related to the ports of Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo The move follows allegations that the UAE used Somali airspace to evacuate a Yemeni separatist leader without federal approval and is linked to broader tensions over Israel’s recognition of the breakaway Somaliland region
- The Somali government stated that the cancellation was based on "reliable reports and evidence" indicating hostile actions by the UAE that threaten Somalia’s constitutional order and territorial integrity
- The decision mandates the immediate expulsion of UAE personnel from military bases in Mogadishu, Bosaso, and Berbera, and revokes Emirati control over key ports
- There was no immediate comment from UAE authorities, and the Somali government has formally notified the UAE and will brief regional and international partners on the move
- The escalation coincides with a sharp deterioration in relations, including reports of UAE aircraft violating a ban on landings and the UAE reportedly beginning to withdraw its military assets from Somalia
... query strategic threat to shipping by restrictions on the ports of Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo
Strategic Threat to Shipping from Port Restrictions
Somalia’s termination of UAE agreements at the ports of Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo poses a moderate but localized strategic threat to regional shipping, primarily due to governance fragmentation and potential disruptions in port operations, rather than immediate large-scale rerouting of global trade.
- Berbera (Somaliland): Operated by UAE’s DP World, this deep-water port is a key Red Sea access point. However, Somalia’s federal government has limited control over Somaliland, which functions as a self-declared republic. The cancellation may not halt operations unless Somaliland complies or faces diplomatic pressure. Berbera’s strategic value lies in its proximity to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and its role in UAE-Ethiopia logistics. Disruption here could affect trade flows between the Gulf, East Africa, and the Horn.
- Bosaso (Puntland): Located on the Gulf of Aden, Bosaso is under Puntland’s authority, which has historically resisted federal directives. Past UAE investment plans here faced local opposition, and actual Emirati operational presence has been limited. Thus, the cancellation has minimal immediate impact on shipping.
- Kismayo (Jubaland): A strategic port in southern Somalia, Kismayo has seen competition among foreign actors (UAE, Turkey, Qatar). While the UAE had ambitions here, its operational footprint was not dominant. The federal government’s ability to enforce the termination is constrained by Jubaland’s semi-autonomous status.
Broader Shipping Implications
- Unlike the Houthi Red Sea crisis, which forced global rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope, Somalia’s port cancellations are more symbolic and political, reflecting sovereignty disputes than operational shutdowns.
- The real risk lies in escalating regional instability, especially if the UAE-Somaliland partnership strengthens in defiance of Mogadishu, potentially triggering broader Horn of Africa tensions affecting maritime security.
- International shipping firms may face increased compliance risks if competing claims over port authority lead to legal or insurance uncertainties.
... hypothetical query is the Somalian government's restriction stronger in effect than a tariff – as compared to, for instance the immediate 25% tariff on nations trading with Iran, imposed by President Trump?
Somalia’s port restrictions and Trump’s 25% tariff on Iran trade differ significantly in scope and economic mechanism, making direct comparison difficult.
- Somalia’s port restrictions are geopolitical and operational, targeting UAE access to strategic ports (Berbera, Bosaso, Kismayo). Their impact is localized and uncertain, depending on enforcement and regional compliance. They disrupt specific logistics chains but do not directly impose broad economic costs on global trade.
- Trump’s 25% tariff is a systemic economic weapon, directly affecting all trade between the US and any nation trading with Iran. It leverages the size of the US market to force global compliance, creating immediate financial disincentives. Given the US is a top trading partner for many countries, the tariff threatens far wider economic consequences than Somalia’s port moves.
In effect, Trump’s tariff is stronger due to the scale and reach of the US economy. A 25% tariff on billions in trade imposes measurable, immediate costs, whereas Somalia’s restrictions rely on political enforcement in a fragmented state and may not halt operations if regional authorities (e.g., Somaliland) defy Mogadishu.
... as a hypothetical retaliatory response Somali sea trade could be totally blockaded by Western defenses in the region and, as a follow-up query, does Somalia have an effective non-merchant Navy to counter such action?
Somalia does not possess an effective non-merchant navy capable of countering a Western-led naval blockade.
- The Somali Navy has been virtually inactive since 1991 due to the collapse of the central government and lack of maintenance. Its last operational vessels—Soviet-era Osa-II missile boats and patrol craft—have long been non-operational.
- While efforts to rebuild the navy are underway, current capabilities remain minimal and coastal, focused on anti-piracy and illegal fishing patrols with limited range and firepower.
- A major 2024 defense agreement with Turkey aims to reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy over ten years. However, this is a long-term capacity-building initiative and has not yet delivered operational warships or anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
- Somalia lacks modern corvettes, submarines, anti-ship missiles, or air cover necessary to challenge Western naval forces, which dominate the region through alliances and bases in Djibouti (e.g., U.S. Camp Lemonnier, French and Chinese bases).
In a hypothetical blockade scenario, Somalia would be unable to mount a military naval response. Its leverage lies in diplomatic and political channels, not maritime combat power.
... as of the time of this report how much American financial aid as yet allocated to Somalia
As of January 13, 2026, the United States has suspended all assistance to Somalia’s federal government. This includes any aid not yet allocated or disbursed.
- The suspension was announced on January 7, 2026, after allegations that Somali officials, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, destroyed a U.S.-funded World Food Program (WFP) warehouse in Mogadishu and seized 76 metric tons of American-funded food aid.
- The State Department stated the suspension applies to all ongoing U.S. assistance programs benefiting the Somali federal government, with resumption contingent on accountability and remedial actions.
- While the U.S. provided $770 million in aid during the last year of the Biden administration (FY2025), no new aid is being released under the current Trump administration pending resolution of the dispute.
- A senior State Department official described Somalia as a “black hole of poorly overseen U.S. assistance,” signaling a broader review and potential termination of aid programs.
Thus, no American financial aid is currently being allocated to the Somali federal government.