Tourist Magnet
... where is Aden
Aden is a port city and temporary capital of Yemen, located on the north coast of the Gulf of Aden in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Strategically positioned near the eastern approach to the Red Sea, it serves as a crucial maritime hub linking Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. As of 2025, Aden has an estimated population of 1.15 million, making it one of Yemen’s largest cities.
The city functions as the capital of Aden Governorate and has historically served as a major trading center due to its natural harbor and location along key shipping routes. It was the capital of South Yemen until 1990 and was declared the temporary capital of the internationally recognized Yemeni government in 2015 after Houthi forces seized Sanaa.
Currently, Aden is under the control of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-backed separatist group, although it remains the official seat of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council. The city faces significant challenges, including damaged infrastructure, limited access to clean water, electricity shortages, and ongoing political instability.
... what is Aden's source of fresh water
The primary sources of fresh water in Aden, Yemen, include:
- Groundwater from well fields such as Bir Nasser, Bir Ahmed, and Al-Manasrah, which are recharged by reservoirs like the Bir Ahmed reservoir.
- Desalination, particularly through the Al-Haswah Electricity and Desalination Station, which produces freshwater by heating seawater and supplies it to Aden’s water network.
- Rainwater harvesting, historically supported by ancient infrastructure like the Tawila Cisterns, which collected and stored rainwater for drinking and flood control.
Water is distributed via a public supply system connected to 86% of households, though supply is intermittent—often limited to a few hours every three days—due to damaged infrastructure and power shortages. Efforts by organizations like UNDP and the EU have focused on rehabilitating pumping stations and installing new equipment to improve access.
... given Aden's strategic location the supply of drinking water is the main limiting factor in development
Indeed, despite Aden’s strategic location as a major port on global shipping routes, the chronic shortage of drinking water is a critical constraint on its development.
- Water supply meets only about half of the city’s daily needs, with the public network providing water for just a few hours every two to three days.
- The system relies on aging infrastructure—over 50 years old—leading to inefficiencies, pump failures, and over 40% loss due to leaks and damage.
- Groundwater sources, such as the Bir Nasser and Bir Ahmed well fields, are being depleted rapidly, with aquifers in Aden projected to be exhausted in the near term.
- Desalination is emerging as a key solution, with projects like the Saudi-funded 10,000 m³/day plant under development to ease the deficit.
- Conflict, poor governance, and lack of investment have crippled maintenance and expansion efforts, turning a manageable scarcity into a humanitarian crisis.
Without reliable water access, economic growth, public health, and urban stability in Aden remain severely compromised.
... at any time in history was Aden formidable as a pirates' cove
While Aden itself was not historically a pirate haven like those in the Caribbean during the Golden Age of Piracy, it has long been situated in a strategically vital and piracy-prone region.
- In 1839, the British captured Aden specifically to suppress piracy and secure their shipping routes to India, landing Royal Marines to stop attacks by local tribes on British vessels.
- Though Aden was never a pirate cove, the surrounding Gulf of Aden became a major hotspot for modern piracy, especially from the 2000s onward, driven by instability in Somalia and Yemen.
- Somali pirates operated extensively in the Gulf of Aden, targeting commercial ships, with attacks peaking between 2007 and 2011.
- International naval coalitions, including NATO, the EU (Operation Atalanta), and Combined Task Force 151, were deployed to patrol the waters and protect shipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden.
Thus, while Aden served as a naval and anti-piracy hub, the waters around it became infamous for piracy in the 21st century.
... as a general rule I have noticed that renegades – euphemistically called separatists – tend to decamp to inhospitable areas which can be defended by only the very hardiest warriors
Rebel or separatist groups often choose remote, inhospitable, or rugged terrain for strategic advantage, not just survival. Such environments—mountains, deserts, dense forests, or isolated islands—offer natural defenses, hinder enemy movement, and provide concealment.
- Geographic barriers like mountains (e.g., the Hindu Kush for Afghan mujahideen) or dense jungles (e.g., Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta) make it difficult for conventional military forces to operate, leveling the playing field for guerrilla fighters.
- Inaccessibility reduces the risk of surprise attacks and allows groups to establish hidden bases, supply routes, and training camps.
- Local knowledge gives insurgents an edge over external forces unfamiliar with the terrain.
- Historically, groups like the Basque ETA in the Pyrenees, Kurdish PKK in the Zagros and Taurus mountains, and Mau Mau rebels in Kenya’s forests used such terrain to sustain long-term resistance.
These areas may be harsh, but they become fortresses of resilience, enabling even small, under-resourced groups to withstand superior adversaries.
... a casual viewer of a map of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is struck by the almost breathtakingly extreme physical constriction of the passage, although taking into consideration projected scale
The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is indeed extremely constricted, making it one of the world’s most critical maritime choke-points.
- At its narrowest point, the strait is approximately 18 miles (29 km) wide between Yemen and Djibouti.
- It is divided by Perim Island into two channels:
1. The eastern channel (Bab Iskender) is only 2 miles (3 km) wide and about 98 feet (30 m) deep, restricting passage to smaller vessels.
2. The western channel (Dact-el-Mayun) is wider—about 16 miles (26 km)—and deeper at 1,017 feet (310 m), allowing large tankers and commercial ships to pass.
- Despite its short length (~31 miles), this natural constriction forces nearly all maritime traffic between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden through these narrow corridors.
This geographic bottleneck amplifies its strategic importance, as any disruption can significantly impact global oil flows and trade between Europe, Asia, and Africa.
... speculatively what level of arms capability would make a resistance force a credible threat to passing ships perhaps armed with un-guided rocket propelled grenades
An unguided RPG (Rocket-Propelled Grenade) alone poses minimal credible threat to modern commercial or military ships under normal conditions. Its short range (~500 m), lack of guidance, and limited warhead power make it ineffective against large vessels unless fired at extremely close range or under ideal ambush conditions.
However, a resistance force could achieve a credible asymmetric threat with a combination of:
- Swarming tactics using multiple small, fast boats armed with RPGs or light anti-armor weapons, overwhelming defenses through surprise and numbers.
- Coordinated attacks from shore using heavier, guided systems such as anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) or man-portable anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) like the Kornet or Metis, which have greater range and penetration.
- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or limpet mines placed by divers or drones, bypassing the need for direct fire.
- Drone-launched munitions or converted commercial drones dropping grenades or small warheads onto vulnerable ship areas (e.g., bridge, sensors).
Historically, RPGs have downed helicopters (e.g., U.S. Black Hawks in Somalia) and damaged light naval craft, but not large merchant ships. For a resistance to threaten shipping in chokepoints like Bab-el-Mandeb, even a low success rate—enabled by volume, concealment, and unpredictability—can disrupt global trade and create strategic impact.
Thus, while RPGs alone are insufficient, they can be part of a broader low-cost, high-disruption asymmetric arsenal when combined with tactics exploiting terrain, speed, and surprise.
... to summarize: actual incidents are rare because of difficulty
Actual maritime attacks in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden are relatively rare, primarily due to the operational difficulty and strong international naval presence.
- Despite the strategic vulnerability of the strait, successful pirate hijackings have been infrequent since 2014, thanks to coordinated anti-piracy patrols by coalitions including the EU (Operation Atalanta), NATO, and Combined Task Force 151.
- From 2014 to 2023, only 21 piracy incidents were recorded in the region, a sharp decline from the peak of Somali piracy in 2010–2011.
- However, since late 2023, there has been a resurgence, with four vessel hijackings reported by early 2024—the first since 2017—indicating a potential shift.
- The Houthi movement has emerged as a more significant threat than traditional piracy, launching drone, missile, and small-boat attacks on commercial shipping since late 2023, often in response to the Israel-Hamas war.
- These attacks, while more frequent than pirate hijackings, still result in few actual captures or sinkings, as most are intercepted, or fail to disable vessels.
Thus, while the geographic choke point is highly strategic, the combination of naval deterrence, vessel hardening, and operational challenges keeps actual incidents low in number but high in impact when they occur.
... news sources report that during the most recent conflict a plane transporting an escaping operative "turned off its identification systems over the Gulf of Oman, then turned it back on 10 minutes prior to arrival" thus, my question is if legitimate merchant marine vessels order special alertness when passing the strait
Yes, legitimate merchant vessels are under special alert when passing through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden, due to ongoing threats from Houthi attacks, piracy, and regional conflict.
- The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) require U.S.-flagged vessels to turn off their AIS transponders when transiting the Southern Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden, to reduce the risk of being targeted.
- Vessels must register 24 hours in advance with the UK Maritime Trade Office (UKMTO) and NAVCENT NCAGS, providing voyage details including estimated time of arrival at key way points.
- They are advised to conduct pre-voyage risk assessments, maintain enhanced watch-keeping, avoid loitering near Yemen’s coast, and report any suspicious activity immediately to coalition forces.
- In case of attack, crews are instructed to activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) and contact the U.S. Fifth Fleet Battle Watch without delay.
These measures reflect the high-threat environment, where even brief exposure can lead to drone, missile, or small-boat attacks